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1. Introduction 
In 1857, Karl Marx (1857/1858, 161) described the emergence of “institutions […] whereby 
each individual can acquire information about the activity of all others” and can build “inter-
connections”. So it seems like it was not Tim Berners Lee, but Karl Marx, who invented the 
World Wide Web (see Fuchs 2014a, 17)! What sounds like a description of the Internet, was 
in fact an analysis of the lists of current prices that were important information sources for the 
organisation of trade in the 19th century. Marx was not just a theorist of capitalism, but also 
one of communications (see Fuchs 2016d, 2009; De La Haye 1980) or what he termed the 
means of communication. It is therefore no surprise that not just the capitalist crisis, but also 
the rise of the Internet has led to an interest in Marx today. We have seen the emergence of 
what can be termed digital Marxism (see for example: Dyer-Witheford 1999, Fisher and 
Fuchs 2015; Fuchs 2014a, 2014c, 2015a; Fuchs and Mosco 2012, 2016; Huws 2003, 2014). 
The journalist Paul Mason tries to join the field of digital Marxism with a popular science 
book titled PostCapitalism. The work’s task is to show how information technology has creat-
ed foundations of what Mason calls a post-capitalist economy. 
2. Long Waves of Economic Development: Kondratieff, Schumpeter and Marx 
Paul Mason sees post-capitalism as a consequence of information technology: “Postcapital-
ism is possible because of three impacts of the new technology in the past twenty-five years” 
(xv): 1) the blurring of boundaries between labour and free time, 2) the abundance of infor-
mation, 3) collaborative digital peer production. “The main contradiction today is between the 
possibility of free, abundant goods and information and a system of monopolies, banks and 
governments trying to keep things private, scarce and commercial” (xix). This analysis over-
estimates information economy because capitalism is not just digital and informational capi-
talism, but at the same time financial capitalism, hyper-industrial, fossil fuel capitalism, mo-
bilities capitalism, etc. (Fuchs 2014a, chapter 5).  
Mason argues for a long wave theory of crisis and capitalism that combines Kondratieff’s 
long wave theory (that assumes that capitalist development has the form of 50-year long 
cycles consisting of 25 years of economic upswing followed by 25 years of downswing) and 
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Marx’s theorem of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (TRPF). The fifth long wave’s 
“takeoff has stalled” (47) because of neoliberalism and information technology (48). “[F]irms 
use profits to pay dividends rather than to reinvest” (71). Factors enabling neoliberalism 
would have been “fiat money, financialisation, the doubling of the workforce, the global im-
balances, including the deflationary effect of cheap labour, plus the cheapening of everything 
else as a result of information technology” (106). 
For Mason, the fourth cycle lasted from the late 1940s until 2008 (72) and was driven by 
“transistors, synthetic materials, mass consumer goods, factory automation, nuclear power 
and automatic calculation” (48). He argues that in contrast to Joseph Schumpeter’s assump-
tions, innovations and the adoption of new technologies do not stem from entrepreneurial 
inventiveness, as Schumpeter argued, but from working class struggles that force capitalism 
to reinvent itself (75-76). The key technologies of the stalled fifth cycle would be “network 
technology, mobile communications, a truly global marketplace and information goods” (48). 
The combination of Kondratieff and Marx in a Marxist version of long-wave theory as al-
ternative to Schumpeterianism is not new. Paul Mason completely ignores and does not 
seem to be aware of Ernest Mandel’s work, especially his book Late Capitalism (Mandel 
1975; for a discussion, see: Fuchs 2016d, 151-152, 211). Mandel argued that there are long 
waves in the development of the rate of profit and that the 4th long wave’s downswing was 
initiated around 1967. Like Mandel, also Mason assumes that the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall drives long waves that last fifty years: “The tendency of the rate of profit to fall, 
interacting constantly with the counter-tendencies, is a much better explanation of what 
drives the fifty-year cycle than the one Kondratieff gave” (p. 77). Mandel wrote in his 1972 
PhD dissertation Late Capitalism: 
 
“The history of capitalism on the international plane thus appears not only as a succes-
sion of cyclical movements every 7 or 10 years, but also as a succession of longer pe-
riods, of approximately 50 years. […] An economic upswing is possible only with a ris-
ing rate of profit, which in its turn creates the conditions for a fresh extension of the 
market and an accentuation of the upswing. At a certain point in this development, 
however, the increased organic composition of capital and the limit to the number of 
commodities that can be sold to the ‘final consumers’ must both lower the rate of profit 
and also induce a relative contraction of the market. These contradictions then spill 
over into a crisis of over-production. The falling rate of profit leads to a curtailment of 
investments which turns the downswing into a depression” (Mandel 1975, 120, 439). 
 
Mason like Kondratieff, Schumpeter and Mandel assumes that “fifty-year cycles are the long-
term rhythm of the profit system” (77). But Mason’s own claims contradict this metaphysical 
assumption that the wave-length is fixed to 50 years: He in other places in the book argues 
that the fourth wave was 60 years long (72). Given that capitalism is a complex, dynamic, 
open system (Fuchs 2004, 2008b, 2002), the deterministic assumption that there are long 
waves that last 50 years is simply not feasible (for a more detailed version of this argument, 
see: Fuchs 2016d, 150-159).  
Other than neo-Schumpeterians such as Christopher Freeman and Carolta Perez, Mason 
rejects the assumption that the information technology paradigm is resulting in a new long 
wave with sustained growth. The reason why he does so is however not scepticism of de-
terministic, undialectical and instrumental logic, but another form of determinism: Paul Mason 
assumes, as we will see, that information technology has to result in the breakdown of capi-
talism. 
3. Karl Marx 
“Marx could not take into account the major phenomena of the twentieth century – state capi-
talism, monopolies, complex financial markets and globalization” (54). Obviously Marx did 
not live in the 20th century. But he was a very anticipatory thinker and, other than Mason 
claims, indeed very well understood globalisation, monopolies, and finance. Already in the 
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Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels pointed out the connection of capitalism, globalisa-
tion and technology, arguing for example that capitalism “has given an immense develop-
ment to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its 
turn, reacted on the extension of industry. […] [Capital] must nestle everywhere, settle eve-
rywhere, establish connexions everywhere” (Marx and Engels 1848, 486, 487). Eric 
Hobsbawm (2011, 112) argues in this context that today we can because of new communi-
cations and a new round of globalisation “see the force of the Manifesto’s predictions more 
clearly than the generations between us and its publication”. 
It is also simply not true that Marx did not see capitalism’s monopoly tendency. This ten-
dency is a key aspect of what Marx in Capital Volume 1 calls the historical tendency of capi-
talist accumulation. This tendency involves the “centralization of capitals” because of the 
“immanent laws of capitalist production itself” so that one “capitalist always strikes down 
many others” (Marx 1867, 929). Marx also saw the speculative dimension and crisis tenden-
cy of financial capital in his analysis of what he termed fictitious capital in Capital Volume 3. 
He spoke of finance as “an entire system of swindling and cheating with respect to the pro-
motion of companies, issues of shares and share dealings” (Marx 1894, 569). 
Against Paul Mason, we have to stress that Marx anticipated many of 20th century capital-
ism’s development tendencies. Capitalism develops dialectically through crises that result in 
sublations (what Hegel called “Aufhebung” in German) that bring about the emergence of 
relatively unpredictable changes. Crises are bifurcation points that destabilise the system. 
Marx’s theory itself is dialectical and historical, which means that it formulates the basic 
foundational structures and tendencies of capitalism, but needs to be adapted and sublated 
for the analysis and critique of the political economy of every specific phase of capitalist de-
velopment. This does not mean that Marx is unsuited for the analysis of contemporary capi-
talism, but rather that the basic tenants of his analysis form the foundations for a dialectical 
analysis of 21st century capitalism and all other epochs of capitalism and class society as 
well as of society in general (see also Fuchs 2016a, 2011).  
4. Marx’s Grundrisse and Informational Exceptionalism 
Paul Mason uses the assumptions of the neo-classical theory of economic goods for formu-
lating a hypothesis of informational exceptionalism: “Info-goods change everything” (116) 
because they are non-rival and non-exclusive in consumption (118) and “can be reproduced 
for free” (117). Information would therefore undermine the price mechanism, result in the 
emergence of a contradiction between artificial capitalist information monopolies and “[p]eer-
produced free stuff” (143) as well as in an alternative non-market info economy consisting for 
example of Wikipedia, Wikileaks, open source, creative commons, free software, etc.  
Paul Mason echoes Jeremy Rifkin’s (2015) claim of the emergence of a zero marginal 
cost society: The convergence of communication technology, energy technology and 
transport technologies in an Internet of things according to Rifkin fosters a near-zero margin-
al cost society, in which the “marginal cost of producing and distributing” information plum-
mets “to near zero” (Rifkin 2015, 5) so that collaborative commons emerge that give momen-
tum to a “transition from the capitalist era to the Collaborative Age”, can “heal the biosphere 
and create a more just, humane, and sustainable global economy for every human being on 
Earth in the first half of the twenty-first century” (Rifkin 2015, 380). Both Paul Mason and Jer-
emy Rifkin are very optimistic that information technology ushers in capitalism’s end and has 
to result in a better world that transcends capitalism. Such an assumption is not just optimis-
tic, but also techno-deterministic. It underestimates the antagonistic character of digital capi-
talism and its imperialistic tendency to create new inner colonies of exploitation.  
Mason’s analysis of post-capitalism is based on a particular reading of Marx’s Fragment 
on Machines in the Grundrisse (Marx 1857/58, 690-714) that has been advanced by one 
theoretical tradition within Autonomist Marxism. This tradition involves authors such as Anto-
nio Negri, Michael Hardt, Carlo Vercellone, Yann Moulier Boutang, Maurizio Lazzarato, and 
Paolo Virno, to whom Mason refers positively when interpreting the Fragment. According to 
this interpretation, the rise of an information economy or what these authors term “cognitive 
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capitalism” invalidates the law of value, completely destroys labour time as the source of 
value, makes value immeasurable and “immaterial”, and thereby fosters crisis and the transi-
tion to communism.  
Marx’s Grundrisse would show that “a machine that lasts for ever, or can be made with no 
labour, cannot add any labour hours to the value of the products it makes” (167). Mason says 
that in the information economy, a  “world of free stuff cannot be capitalist” (142), “infor-
mation corrodes value” (143), and “value vanishes” (170). He argues that information tech-
nology creates a timeless economy that is independent from labour time: “Useful stuff that 
can be made with tiny amounts of human labour is probably going to end up being free, 
shared and commonly owned” (164). “Info-tech is just the latest outcome of an innovation 
process lasting 250 years. But information injects a new dynamic. Because with info-tech you 
can have machines that cost nothing, last for ever and do not break down” (164). “The real 
wonder of information is not that it is immaterial but that it eradicates the need for labour on 
an incalculable scale” (165). “Technologically, we are headed for zero-price goods, unmeas-
urable work, an exponential takeoff in productivity and the extensive automation of physical 
processes. Socially, we are trapped in a world of monopolies, inefficiency, the ruins of a fi-
nance-dominated free market and a proliferation of ‘bullshit jobs’. Today, the main contradic-
tion in modern capitalism is between the possibility of free, abundant socially produced 
goods, and a system of monopolies, banks and governments struggling to maintain control 
over power and information. That is, everything is pervaded by a fight between network and 
hierarchy” (144). 
Mason argues that there are “structural obstacles” (173) to the emergence of info-
capitalism: zero costs, zero price, the problem of reskilling, and human resistance to com-
modification. “So what we have in reality is an info-capitalism struggling to exist. We should 
be going through a third industrial revolution but it has stalled. […] An economy based on 
information, with its tendency to zero-cost products and weak property rights, cannot be a 
capitalist economy” (175).  
In an appendix to the book Reading Marx in the Information Age, I have focused on the 
Grundrisse’s “Fragment on Machines” (Fuchs 2016d, 360-375) and have discussed the ver-
sion of autonomist Marxism to which Paul Mason relates to in detail. One main problem of 
this interpretation is that it misreads the Fragment, especially that passage, where Marx 
writes that “labour time ceases and must cease to be” the measure of wealth (Marx 1857/58, 
705). This peculiar version of Autonomism assumes that this formulation implies that the rise 
of information technology and cognitive capitalism abolishes the law of value within capital-
ism and results in the automatic transition to cognitive communism. 
But Marx makes clear that the context of the situation he describes is that the “mass of 
workers” has appropriated “their own surplus labour” (Marx 1857/58, 708) and that “produc-
tion based on exchange value breaks down” (705). Marx speaks of the breakdown of the law 
of value in post-capitalism, not in capitalism! As long as capitalism exists, the law of value 
institutes the exploitation of labour in space and time. Information technology advances the 
contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, but does not 
invalidate the law of value.  
Roman Rosdolsky (1977, 428) in his seminal study of Marx’s Grundrisse argued in this 
context that Marx in the Fragment had the “withering away of the law of value under social-
ism” in mind, but not under capitalism. Moishe Postone (2008, 126) stresses the crisis of 
value in capitalism is “not simply superseded by a new form of wealth”, but rather value “re-
mains the necessary structural precondition of capitalist society”. “Capitalism does give rise 
to the possibility of its own negation, but it does not automatically evolve into something else” 
(Postone 2008, 127). Rosdolsky’s study of the Grundrisse and the works of Postone, who is 
one of the major Marxist value critics, are just two of the Marxist works that Mason is obvi-
ously not aware of, which results in a one-dimensional, deterministic interpretation of the 
labour theory of value. Mason also ignores the state of the art in discussions about the digital 
labour theory of value (see Fisher and Fuchs 2015, Fuchs 2014a; Fuchs 2015a, chapters 4-
6). This is a fairly complex and multidimensional debate, in which there are multiple strands 
of thought that foreground different categories, such as productive digital labour, the collec-
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tive worker, the sphere of circulation, rent, advertising as ideological transport labour, repro-
ductive labour, consumption work, audience and user labour/commodification, the political 
economy of targeted online advertising, or immaterial labour/cognitive capitalism. Mason only 
relies on the latter category and interpretation of the digital labour theory of value. 
Although the copying time of information is very small, there are ways of how capital tries 
to institute new forms of labour-time, value creation and exploitation in the information econ-
omy. First, commercial software and other information goods are not just produced once and 
then copied, but there are often new versions, constant updates, and forms of support la-
bour. It is therefore no surprise that the number of annual hours worked in the sector of IT 
and other information services (that includes software engineering among other types of 
work) has for example in Germany increased from 765 million annual hours in 2000 to 1.069 
billion in 2010 (data source: OECD STAN).  
Second, one has to see that large parts of the Internet’s political economy are based on 
targeted advertising. The advertising industry is just a footnote in Mason’s analysis, although 
global advertising revenue grew from £234 billion in 210 to £283 billion in 2014 (Ofcom 
2015). The share of online advertising in total advertising has been rapidly increasing, con-
tributing to the crisis of commercial print media. Google and Facebook are not communica-
tions corporations. They are the world’s largest advertising companies (Fuchs 2014c). Adver-
tising is not just based on the labour-time of marketing professionals, but also on the atten-
tion time of audiences and on commercial Internet usage time that is (unpaid) labour time. 
Dallas Smythe’s theory allows us to understand this phenomenon in the context of the blur-
ring of the boundaries between labour and leisure and between toil and play (Fuchs 2014a, 
2014c, 2015a).  
Third, there is an international division of digital labour, in which various forms of labour 
are organised (Fuchs 2014a, 2015a). It ranges from the exploitation of enslaved miners in 
the Congo, Tayloristic ICT assemblers at Foxconn in China, or software engineers in India or 
the Silicon Valley to various forms of unpaid online labour (ibid.). The production of infor-
mation technology is highly exploitative and time-consuming. The assumption of value col-
lapse in the information economy underestimates the dangers of actually existing exploitation 
in the capitalist world economy.  
Fourth, there are various forms of irregular, unpaid, precarious, outsourced, 
crowdsourced, and click-worked digital labour. Examples include the usage of Facebook, 
Google, YouTube, Weibo, LinkedIn, Pinterest and Instagram; online customer reviews on 
Amazon or Yelp; work via freelancer platforms such as Upwork, PeoplePerHour, Amazon 
Mechanical Turk and ClickWorker; the participation in customer surveys, installing software 
updates, deleting spam, unsubscribing from spam lists, the time spent on online daring plat-
forms such as match.com or Tinder, answering professional e-mails via the mobile or tablet 
out of regular working hours, working on the train, tube or in cafés; online travel booking, etc.  
Unpaid labour and productive consumption that creates value goes beyond the Internet: 
Think of self-service gas stations, the self-assemblage of IKEA furniture, housework, com-
muting time, washing your garbage before disposing it, ATMs, self-check out machines in 
supermarkets, the culture of unpaid internships, check-in machines at airports, ticket vending 
machines at tube, train and bus stations, automated service kiosks in privatised post offices, 
automated vending machines, self-service bars in restaurants, fast food restaurants, etc. 
“Shadow working includes all the unpaid tasks we do on behalf of businesses. […] Custom-
ers pump their own gasoline, draft their own bear, serve their own frogurt, and scoop up bag-
fuls of basmati rice and then label them, at the bulk-food section of Whole Foods. They fill 
plates at salad bars and ladle soups, lo mein, mac and cheese, or scrambled eggs from the 
soup bars. […] With 3-D printers, they need only download design to ‘print out’ many objects 
they would have bought at a store not long ago. This is home manufacturing” (Lambert 2015, 
1, 251-252).  
Consumer and prosumers labour is shadow work because it does not in an obvious way 
feel like work, but creates value for corporations. It takes time. And it takes time away that 
could be used outside the commodity culture. It substitutes paid labour by precarious and 
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unpaid labour and by reducing corporations’ wage-sum helps increasing their profits. Con-
sumers and users have become part of the working class. 
I am not arguing for upholding stupefying labour that could much better be conducted by 
machines, but rather want to stress that the contradictions that Marx describes in the Frag-
ment have in the age of information technology become so acute that the automation and 
digitisation of labour result not just in unemployment, but also new forms of exploitation that 
are often not just precarious, but also unseen and hidden. 
That the law of value has not died becomes evident if one looks at the largest transna-
tional digital media corporations that make massive profits. In 2015, Apple was the world’s 
12th largest transnational corporation with annual profits of US$ 44.5 billion. Microsoft was 
the 25th largest (annual profits: US$ 20.7 bn), Google the 39th largest (US$ 13.7 bn), IBM the 
44th largest (US$ 12 bn), Comcast the 46th largest (US$ 8.4), Disney the 84th largest (US$ 7.8 
bn), Hewlett-Packard the 96th largest (US$ 5 bn), Foxconn the 122nd largest (US$ 4.3 bn), 
21st Century Fox the 150th largest (US$ 9.3 bn), Time Warner the 163rd largest (US$ 3.8 bn), 
etc. (data source: Forbes 2000, 2015 list). These profits do not fall from heaven and are not 
created out of nothing. They are the result of capital’s exploitation of paid, unpaid, precari-
ous, outsourced, or crowdsourced digital labour-time that creates economic value in the in-
ternational division of digital labour.  
The reason why the Internet economy is (like all parts of capitalism) prone to crisis is not 
that it lies beyond value and labour-time. Rather there are exaggerated ideological expecta-
tions that the rise of the Internet can compensate for the fall of profits in other parts of the 
economy. Every new development in the digital world results in a new version of digital sub-
lime (Mosco 2004), i.e. techno-optimistic ideologies that fetishise the Internet and computing. 
The capitalist Internet therefore comes along with expectations of massive profit rates that 
diverge from actual economic reality. These surplus expectations go beyond the actual pos-
sibilities inherent in the exploitation of digital labour, which drives the financialisation of the 
Internet economy so that financial bubbles emerge that can burst as the dot.com-crisis 
showed in the year 2000. 
The rise of information technology has resulted in contradictions that have both created a 
new digital and consumer proletariat that is part of the global working class and financialised 
information monopolies that make informational capitalism prone to crisis. Digital and infor-
mational capitalism is not impossible, as Mason claims. It is a reality, in which we have to live 
today. The digital law of value has created new forms of exploitation as well as contradictions 
that allow the creation of new spheres of non-commercial, alternative, co-operative produc-
tion and a solidarity, commons-based, and peer production economy outside the realm of 
capitalism that undermine the law of value. But the aim and tendency of destroying the law of 
value is not an automatism that flows from information and information technology. It can 
rather only be achieved in conscious political struggles for the decommodification of infor-
mation, the economy and the world. It requires the dialectical political unity of the social 
movement crowd and the party (Dean 2016). “Crowds amass, but they don’t endure. […] [It 
is] the crowd that pushes the party to exceed expectations, [and] the party that finds the 
courage of the people in the haste of the crowd. […] [The] party works to extend the collec-
tive desire for collectivity after the crowds go home” (Dean 2016, 26, 260). 
5. Class Struggle and Political Change 
Paul Mason fails to make a profound and significant contribution to digital Marxism. His anal-
ysis is a one-dimensional, techno-deterministic breakdown theory that ignores digital labour 
analysis, the international division of digital labour, and the contradiction between digital la-
bour and digital capital.  
What Paul Mason is good at is identifying and describing political demands that can help 
to advance conditions for the creation of a post-capitalist society (see chapter 10). Such de-
mands include the reduction of standard working hours; advancing support for co-ops, the 
solidarity and commons-based peer production economy; the reduction of carbon emissions, 
the strengthening of the welfare state and gratis public services, the reduction of inequalities, 
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the socialisation of the finance system, fostering human-centred automation, ending privati-
sation, starting state-led infrastructure projects (housing, transport, healthcare, education, 
etc.), debt write-off, the closure of tax havens, a clampdown on tax avoidance, the introduc-
tion of a universal basic income funded from taxation, etc. (292). 
At least two ideas should be added and stressed: 1) There are different forms of tax-
funded universal basic income – neoliberal and progressive basic income. In neoliberal basic 
income, the tax system is changed in such a way that the poor have a minimum income, but 
overall there is a redistribution from lower to upper income and wealth groups by measures 
such as flat taxation and the partial abolishment of the welfare state, which puts the first at a 
social disadvantage. It is no wonder that Milton Freedman embraced the idea of such a basic 
income. One version of neoliberal basic income is to abolish all taxes, except for VAT that is 
massively increased. Progressive basic income in contrast is a measure that combines uni-
versal economic rights with increasing the taxation of capital and the rich. Some years ago, I 
helped designing models of how progressive basic income could be implemented in the 
German-speaking world’s basic income movement. The contradiction between neoliberal 
and progressive basic income became very evident in this movement. My political point has 
in this context always been that I do not care about basic income as such, but only about a 
socialist and redistributive basic income.  
2) Paul Mason sees the necessity to combine civil society and state politics in progressive 
politics. The problem of alternative projects has to do with the radical Left’s traditional scepti-
cism of the state. Such projects often lack resources, remain an alternative ghetto for the 
enlightened left-wing few, are based on voluntary, highly self-exploitative labour, and as a 
result of all of this cannot challenge the power of capitalism. We need mechanisms that 
combine progressive state and civil society action. One of them is what I term the participa-
tory media fee (Fuchs 2015b): Additional state revenues generated by capital taxation, for 
example by taxing advertising, are in this model redistributed via participatory budgeting to 
citizens, who receive a citizens cheque. They are required to donate the annual sum they 
receive to non-commercial media or cultural project that help advancing the public sphere.  
When discussing political change potentials, the question arises who the potential sub-
jects of this change are. For Paul Mason, contemporary protestors constitute this political 
subject. So he sees the need for active, conscious political praxis. But given his techno-
deterministic framework, it seems like such praxis is not relatively autonomous, but the au-
tomatic result of the blind necessity forced by information technology on society and human 
subjects. Protest appears in Mason’s account to be an automatic and necessary force of 
history. Such an analysis underestimates the role of ideologies that can forestall political 
change and political movements. Crises do not determine, but only condition political strug-
gles. Crises as capitalism’s objective dialectical factor condition the possibilities for and limits 
of subjective contradictions, in which humans intervene collectively into society and try to 
change it. “Not the slightest natural necessity or automatic inevitability guarantees the transi-
tion from capitalism to socialism. […] The revolution requires the maturity of many forces, but 
the greatest among them is the subjective force, namely, the revolutionary class itself. The 
realization of freedom and reason requires the free rationality of those who achieve it. Marxi-
an theory is, then, incompatible with fatalistic determinism (Marcuse 1941, 318-319; for a 
detailed discussion of Herbert Marcuse’s critical theory in the age of digital and social media, 
see Fuchs 2016b, chapter 4). 
Who exactly is the progressive political subject for Paul Mason? He speaks of “a new 
agent of change in history: the educated and connected human being” (xvii). “In the past 
twenty years, capitalism has mustered a new social force that will be its gravedigger, just as 
it assembled the factory proletariat in the nineteenth century. It is the networked individuals 
who have camped in the city squares, blockaded the fracking sites, performed punk rock on 
the roofs of Russian cathedrals, raised defiant cans of beer in the face of Islamism on the 
grass of Gezi Park, pulled a million people on to the streets of Rio and São Paulo and now 
organized mass strikes across southern China. They are the working class ‘sublated’ – im-
proved upon and replaced” (212).  
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Almost all managers, CEOs, and other members of the class of the 1% are “educated and 
connected”. They are the globalised, networked, educated, influential –  and wealthy. Are the 
educated, connected and networked hedge fund manager and the educated, connected and 
networked entrepreneur, who parks and hides his wealth in tax havens, part of this subject? 
Definitely not! Education, networking and connectedness are not automatically politically 
progressive. When we assume that educated, connected, networked individuals are the pro-
gressive subject, then this means that the 1% must be the avant-garde of the Left, which is 
an absurd assumption. Also fascist leaders and activists can be educated and are mostly not 
just populists, but also highly connected and networked. We must see that a significant share 
of contemporary political action is fascist, racist or right-wing extremist in character. Not only 
is it relatively open if in a situation of crisis, protest emerges or is forestalled by ideologies 
and repression, also the dominant political direction of such politics is not determined. 
Paul Mason’s take on political change is naïve. This became also evident in his 2012 book 
Why It’s Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions (Mason 2012), in which he 
fostered the myth of contemporary protests being Facebook and Twitter revolutions. If one 
bases books on journalistic observations and not on systematic, critical empirical studies, 
then such short-circuited, one-dimensional analyses are the outcome. What Paul Mason ob-
serves as a journalist on some squares of the world and in his interviews can at best be a 
partial truth, half-truth or untruth. It is not based on a social science methodology. Empirical 
research has in contrast shown that online media neither cause contemporary protests and 
revolutions nor are they unimportant (see for example: Aouragh 2016, Fuchs 2014b, 
Gerbaudo 2012, Salem 2015, Wilson and Dunn 2011, Wolfson 2014). Protests are shaped 
by dialectics of mediation and the streets, the Internet and the squares, online and offline, 
face-to-face and mediated communication, traditional and new media (Fuchs 2014b). Some-
times it would be better that journalists go (back) to university and do PhDs in order to learn 
some social science and conduct systematic empirical research before they write books.  
Not the educated, connected, and networked form a political subject today. The potentially 
progressive political subject-in-itself is rather formed by all those whose labour produces the 
commons, but does not control, expropriate and dispossess the commons of nature, the so-
cial, knowledge, culture, technology, care, and education. The 1% are not part of this political 
subject, but rather form its dialectical opposite.  
6. Conclusion 
Paul Mason’s book Post-Capitalism fetishises information technology. It ignores the role of 
digital labour and the contradiction between digital labour and digital capital in the interna-
tional division of digital labour. It is based on a one-dimensional, functionalist reading of Marx 
and misses to understand digital capitalism’s imperialistic character (Fuchs 2016c). It sees 
human praxis as a blind necessity emanating from information technology and is based on a 
linear, techno-deterministic, functionalist logic: 
 
Information technology => Zero-marginal costs of information => Tendency of the Rate of 
Profit to Fall => Breakdown of capitalism => Post-capitalism 
 
“We need to be unashamed utopians” (288): Paul Mason is a utopian socialist 2.0, who sees 
the utopia of socialist post-capitalism not as the outcome of socialist praxis’ active hope, but 
as the result of information technology. The book stands in the tradition of other breakdown 
theories of capitalism. Although theoretically much less sophisticated, it is not unrelated to 
the German Marxist Robert Kurz’s approach. In books such as Der Kollaps der Modernisier-
ung (Kurz 1991), Schwarzbuch Kapitalismus (1999), or Geld ohne Wert: Grundrisse zu einer 
Transformation der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Kurz 2012), Kurz argues that the microe-
lectronic revolution destroys the substance of value and results in an inevitable decrease of 
the rate of profit that leads to capitalism’s collapse and the emergence of a post-capitalist 
society: 
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“Briefly, one can say that with the microelectronic revolution starting in the early 1980s, 
whose potential is far from being exhausted, not only the Fordist Expansion but the ex-
pansion of productive labor and therefore real value creation also stagnated; productive 
labor has since been in retreat on a global scale. This means that the historical com-
pensation mechanism, which sustained the parallel expansion of capitalistically unpro-
ductive labor, no longer exists. The basis of capitalist reproduction has truly reached its 
absolute limit, although its collapse (in the fullest sense of the word) has not yet taken 
place on the formal phenomenological plane. But such an event would no longer mere-
ly take the form of an accelerated decrease in the rate of profit” (Kurz 1995).  
 
The analysis in Mason’s book also resembles the parent of all economic breakdown theories, 
Henryk Grossmann’s 1929 book Das Akkumulations- und Zusammenbruchsgesetz des 
kapitalistischen Systems (The Law of the Accumulation and Breakdown of the Capitalist Sys-
tem). Grossmann gives a mathematical example (based on a calculation that Otto Bauer 
[1912/1913] provided in an essay), in which capitalism breaks down after 35 years. He ar-
gues that the example shows that Marx’s theorem of the tendency of the profit rate to fall 
brings about the automatic breakdown of capitalism. 
 
“If the capitalist system inevitably breaks down due to the relative decline in the mass 
of profit we can understand why Marx ascribed such enormous importance to the ten-
dential fall in the rate of profit, which is simply the expression of this breakdown” 
(Grossmann 1992, 119). 
“The capitalist mechanism falls sick not because it contains too much surplus value but 
because it contains too little. The valorisation of capital is its basic function and the sys-
tem dies because this function cannot be fulfilled” (Grossmann 1992, 126). 
“Marx roots the breakdown in the social form of production; in the fact that the capitalist 
mechanism is regulated by profit and at a certain level of capitalist accumulation there 
is not enough profit to ensure valorisation of the accumulated capital” (Grossmann 
1992, 127). 
 
Bauer calculated the development of the rate of profit in his example only for four years. 
Grossmann extended the calculation over 35 years (compare: Fuchs 2002, 254). The prob-
lem is that the example is constructed in such a way that the rate of surplus value remains 
constant while the organic composition of capital increases. In reality, class struggle on be-
half of capital can increase the rate of surplus value and act as countervailing tendency so 
that class struggle is a crucial intervening variable in the development of the rate of profit 
(Fuchs 2016d, 348-350; Fuchs and Sandoval 2014; Fuchs and Garnham 2014, 125-126). 
Grossmann acknowledges the existence of countervailing tendencies, but argues that the 
breakdown tendency in the end must assert itself and must result in a final crisis: “Despite 
the periodic interruptions that repeatedly defuse the tendency towards breakdown, the 
mechanism as a whole tends relentlessly towards its final end with the general process of 
accumulation. As the accumulation of capital grows absolutely, the valorisation of this ex-
panded capital becomes progressively more difficult. Once these countertendencies are 
themselves defused or simply cease to operate, the breakdown tendency gains the upper 
hand and asserts, itself in the absolute form as the final crisis” (Grossmann 1992, 85).  
Also Lenin (1964, 154) overlooked the negative aspects of technology when he idealised 
the Taylor system’s inhumanity and thought it was ready made for application in a socialist 
society: 
 
“The Taylor system – without its initiators knowing or wishing it – is preparing the time 
when the proletariat will take over all social production and appoint its own workers’ 
committees for the purpose of properly distributing and rationalising all social labour. 
Large-scale production, machinery, railways, telephone – all provide thousands of op-
portunities to cut by three-fourths the working time of the organised workers and make 
them four times better off than they are today”. 
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The point is that capitalism and domination inherently shape the character of technologies. It 
is therefore unlikely that a technology in capitalism only has positive and emancipatory roles 
and potentials. Modern technology has contradictory tendencies that can support emancipa-
tion and repression. The point is that it is a political task to reshape both society and technol-
ogy in an integrated manner so that democratic socialism can be advanced. 
The rate of profit depends on the organic composition of capital and the rate of surplus-
value. It is directly proportional to the rate of surplus-value and indirectly proportional to the 
organic composition (Fuchs 2016d, 248-256, 347-351). Technological development can bring 
about an increase of both, so that an actual rise or fall of the rate of profit and the economic 
expression of the tendency depend on the results of class struggle and the degree of coun-
tervailing tendencies (Fuchs 2016d, 248-256, 347-351). There is no necessary breakdown of 
capitalism. Information technology only conditions, but does not determine capitalism’s ob-
jective and subjective contradictions and their development.  
The collective worker of the world has to politically unite in order bring about the humani-
sation of society and technology. Paul Mason is digital Marxism’s Grossmann 2.0. Such an 
assessment is the opposite of praise for a book. PostCapitalism: A Guide to our Future is 
successful in market terms (in capitalist ideological terms this means that it is a “bestseller”) 
not because of the superiority of its analysis, but because its author due to his journalistic 
activity has more than 200,000 Twitter followers and has become widely known by appear-
ances on BBC and Channel 4’s news broadcasts. The stratification of media attention in the 
capitalist society of the spectacle results in a divergence of attention so that high levels of 
sales, revenues and attention can very well accompany low academic, theoretical and ana-
lytical quality. The poverty of theory sells if it blinks and screams glaringly and loud enough in 
the attention economy, even if it just imitates, copies and disguises itself as digital Marxism.  
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